A Portfolio Approach to Accelerate Therapeutic Innovation in Ovarian Cancer

Chaudhuri, Shomesh E., Katherine Cheng, Andrew W. Lo, Shirley Pepke, Sergio Rinaudo, Lynda Roman, and Ryan Spencer, 2019, Journal of Investment Management 17(2), 5–16.

ABSTRACT We consider a portfolio-based approach to financing ovarian cancer therapeutics in which multiple candidates are funded within a single structure. Twenty-five potential early-stage drug development projects were identified for inclusion in a hypothetical portfolio through interviews with gynecological oncologists and leading experts, a review of ovarian cancer-related trials registered in the ClinicalTrials.gov database, and an extensive literature review. The annualized returns of this portfolio were simulated under a purely private sector structure both with and without partial funding from philanthropic grants, and a public-private partnership that included government guarantees. We find that public-private structures of this type can increase expected returns and reduce tail risk, allowing greater amounts of private sector capital to fund early-stage research and development.

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Is the FDA Too Conservative or Too Aggressive?: A Bayesian Decision Analysis of Clinical Trial Design

Isakov, Leah, Andrew W. Lo, and Vahid Montazerhodjat, 2019, Journal of Econometrics 211(1), 117–136.

ABSTRACT Implicit in the drug-approval process is a host of decisions—target patient population, control group, primary endpoint, sample size, follow-up period, etc.—all of which determine the trade-off between Type I and Type II error. We explore the application of Bayesian decision analysis (BDA) to minimize the expected cost of drug approval, where the relative costs of the two types of errors are calibrated using U.S. Burden of Disease Study 2010 data. The results for conventional fixed-sample randomized clinical-trial designs suggest that for terminal illnesses with no existing therapies such as pancreatic cancer, the standard threshold of 2.5% is substantially more conservative than the BDA-optimal threshold of 23.9% to 27.8%. For relatively less deadly conditions such as prostate cancer, 2.5% is more risk-tolerant or aggressive than the BDA-optimal threshold of 1.2% to 1.5%. We compute BDA-optimal sizes for 25 of the most lethal diseases and show how a BDA-informed approval process can incorporate all stakeholders’ views in a systematic, transparent, internally consistent, and repeatable manner.

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Estimation of Clinical Trial Success Rates and Related Parameters

Wong, Chi Heem, Kien Wei Siah, and Andrew W. Lo, 2019, Biostatistics 20, 273–286.

ABSTRACT Previous estimates of drug development success rates rely on relatively small samples from databases curated by the pharmaceutical industry and are subject to potential selection biases. Using a sample of 406 038 entries of clinical trial data for over 21 143 compounds from January 1, 2000 to October 31, 2015, we estimate aggregate clinical trial success rates and durations. We also compute disaggregated estimates across several trial features including disease type, clinical phase, industry or academic sponsor, biomarker presence, lead indication status, and time. In several cases, our results differ significantly in detail from widely cited statistics. For example, oncology has a 3.4% success rate in our sample vs. 5.1% in prior studies. However, after declining to 1.7% in 2012, this rate has improved to 2.5% and 8.3% in 2014 and 2015, respectively. In addition, trials that use biomarkers in patient-selection have higher overall success probabilities than trials without biomarkers.

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New Business Models to Accelerate Innovation in Pediatric Oncology Therapeutics

Das, Sonya, Raphaël Rousseau, Peter C. Adamson, and Andrew W. Lo, 2018, JAMA Oncology, published online June 2, doi:10.1001/jamaoncol.2018.1739.

ABSTRACT Few patient populations are as helpless and in need of advocacy as children with cancer. Pharmaceutical companies have historically faced significant financial disincentives to pursue pediatric oncology therapeutics, including low incidence, high costs of conducting pediatric trials, and a lack of funding for early-stage research. Review of published studies of pediatric oncology research and the cost of drug development, as well as clinical trials of pediatric oncology therapeutics at ClinicalTrials.gov, identified 77 potential drug development projects to be included in a hypothetical portfolio. The returns of this portfolio were simulated so as to compute the financial returns and risk. Simulated business strategies include combining projects at different clinical phases of development, obtaining partial funding from philanthropic grants, and obtaining government guarantees to reduce risk. The purely private-sector portfolio exhibited expected returns ranging from −24.2% to 10.2%, depending on the model variables assumed. This finding suggests significant financial disincentives for pursuing pediatric oncology therapeutics and implies that financial support from the public and philanthropic sectors is essential. Phase diversification increases the likelihood of a successful drug and yielded expected returns of −5.3% to 50.1%. Standard philanthropic grants had a marginal association with expected returns, and government guarantees had a greater association by reducing downside exposure. An assessment of a proposed venture philanthropy fund demonstrated stronger performance than the purely private-sector–funded portfolio or those with traditional amounts of philanthropic support. A combination of financial and business strategies has the potential to maximize expected return while eliminating some downside risk—in certain cases enabling expected returns as high as 50.1%—that can overcome current financial disincentives and accelerate the development of pediatric oncology therapeutics.

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Optimal Financing for R&D-Intensive Firms

Thakor, Richard T. and Andrew W. Lo, 2018, Working Paper.

ABSTRACT We develop a theory of optimal financing for R&D-intensive firms that uses their unique features—large capital outlays, long gestation periods, high upside, and low probabilities of R&D success—that explains three prominent stylized facts about these firms: their relatively low use of debt, large cash balances, and underinvestment in R&D. The model relies on the interaction of the unique features of R&D-intensive firms with three key frictions: adverse selection about R&D viability, asymmetric information about the upside potential of R&D, and moral hazard from risk shifting. We establish the optimal pecking order of securities with direct market financing. Using a tradeoff between tax benefits and the costs of risk shifting for debt, we establish conditions under which the firm uses an all-equity capital structure and firms raise enough financing to carry excess cash. A firm may use a limited amount of debt if it has pledgeable assets in place. However, market financing still leaves potentially valuable R&D investments unfunded. We then use a mechanism design approach to explore the potential of intermediated financing, with a binding precommitment by firm insiders to make costly ex post payouts. A mechanism consisting of put options can be used in combination with equity to eliminate underinvestment in R&D relative to the direct market financing outcome. This optimal intermediary-assisted mechanism consists of bilateral “insurance” contracts, with investors offering firms insurance against R&D failure and firms offering investors insurance against very high R&D payoffs not being realized.

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